Therapy, Individual and Society in Tusculan Disputations III

The objective of this paper is to argue that the notion of philosophy as therapy presented in Tusculan Disputations III is not sufficient to eradicate false opinions in society, given the individual character that Stoicism proposes. To support this argument, this paper first describes Foucault’s characteristics of self-care in the Hellenistic and Roman periods since philosophy, understood as a therapy for life, is framed in the French thinker’s notion of "Care of the Self" that is, the ability of philosophy to cure the soul so that one can behave in harmony with nature and lead a happy and undisturbed life. This analysis aims to show to what extent the therapy Cicero describes in Tusculan Disputations III functions as care of the self. Second, based on the elements of Care of the Self in the light of stoic therapy. This paper examines the origin of false opinions to argue that, while therapy is effective for an ethical dimension of human behavior, it is insufficient to eradicate the origin of false opinions in society. Finally, this paper will suggest a possible solution to the problem of opinions and emotions that arise in society based on what Martha Nussbaum tells us about envy in Political Emotions.