Mentalización vs lectura del comportamiento: El problema lógico de la evidencia sobre el conocimiento de otras mentes en chimpancés

Carmen Rodríguez Ponce

doi:10.28970/hh.2022.2.a4

Artículos de investigación

Mentalization vs. Behavioral Reading: The Logical Problem of the Evidence for Knowledge of Other Minds in Chimpanzees

Authors

Carmen Rodríguez Ponce Universidad de Antioquia ,

Mentalization is a capacity that can be defined as the ability to attribute mental states that stand between observable behavior and the future action of others. This ability has been studied for decades, but research has failed to establish whether the ability is solely human. That being said, it raises the question: are chimpanzees capable of attributing mental states that intervene between behavior and future action or are they only capable of reading behavior? The answer to this question has not been determined because the mentalization hypothesis and the behavioral reading hypothesis have the same experimental variables to justify themselves. Thus, a logical problem is configured, namely, the debate between the two hypotheses. This article introduces the discussion between the mentalization hypothesis and the behavioral reading hypothesis to explain chimpanzee behavior. This will be achieved by analyzing what has been said about the mentalization hypothesis and behavioral reading in philosophy, then, both hypotheses will be delimited. Finally, the experimental approaches that have explored the solution of the logical problem will be explained.

Keywords:

Behavior, Chimpanzees, Mental states, Mentalization, Logical problem, Observable signals

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