Atención conjunta mediada y el problema de lacircularidad del entendimiento social constituido porla interacción social

Miguel Ángel  Prieto-Castellanos

doi:10.28970/

Artículos de investigación

Mediated Joint Attention and the Problem of the Circularity of theSocial Understanding Constituted by Social Interaction

Authors

Miguel Ángel Prieto-Castellanos Universidad de La Sabana ,

John Anderson P-Duarte (2019) explains joint attention based on one of the most widespread approaches in mind research, namely autopoietic enactivism (De Jaegher & Di Paolo, 2007; Gallagher, 2011). This paper aims to say that P-Duarte’s explanation inherits a problem that enactivist social interaction accounts have. According to Martens and Schlicht (2017), these kinds of explanations involve a vicious circularity in such a way that social interaction is used to account for social interaction. In this text, I argue, firstly, that I believe that P-Duarte’s account of joint attention inherits this same problem, and, secondly, I discuss why P Duarte’s theoretical resources are insufficient to get over this impasse. If I am right, this constitutes a corrosive problem for joint attention’s accounts based on autopoietic enactivism, which should be taken seriously.

Keywords:

joint attention, co-perceiver, perception, social interaction

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Prieto-Castellanos, M. Ángel . (2024). Mediated Joint Attention and the Problem of the Circularity of theSocial Understanding Constituted by Social Interaction. Humanitas Hodie, 7(1), 3-24. https://doi.org/10.28970/

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Vol. 7 No. 1 (2024)

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2024-07-30

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Universidad de La Sabana

Author Biography

Miguel Ángel Prieto-Castellanos, Universidad de La Sabana

Magíster en Filosofía de la Ciencia de Leibniz Universität Hannover y realiza estudios de maestría en Ciencias Cognitivas en Osnabrück Universität (Alemania).