Accessibility and Phenomenality: Remarks on Solving Molyneux’s Question Empirically

Juan R. Loaiza

doi:10.28970/hh.2019.2.a3

Artículos de investigación

Accessibility and Phenomenality

Remarks on Solving Molyneux’s Question Empirically

Authors

Juan R. Loaiza Universidad del Rosario https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0570-3832 ,

In the xvii century, William Molyneux asked John Locke whether a newly-sighted person could reliably identify a cube from a sphere without aid from their touch. While this might seem an easily testable question, answering it is not so straightforward. In this paper, I illustrate this question and claim that some distinctions regarding the concept of consciousness are important for an empirical solution. First, I will describe Molyneux’s question as it was proposed by Molyneux himself, and I’ll briefly say something about its early debates. Second, I will go over some empirical attempts to solve this question, including recent experiments coming from neuroscience. Third, I will introduce some distinctions with regards to consciousness, and in the following section I will apply them to the Molyneux case. Finally, I will shortly consider some consequences of this approach. I conclude by suggesting researchers pay attention to different senses in which Molyneux’s question might be posed for empirical purposes.

Keywords:

visual perception, touch perception, modalities, phenomenology, consciousness

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Loaiza, J. R. (2019). Accessibility and Phenomenality: Remarks on Solving Molyneux’s Question Empirically. Humanitas Hodie, 2(2), 1-20. https://doi.org/10.28970/hh.2019.2.a3

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Vol. 2 No. 2 (2019):

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2019-06-20

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Loaiza, J. R. (2019). Accessibility and Phenomenality: Remarks on Solving Molyneux’s Question Empirically. Humanitas Hodie, 2(2), 1-20. https://doi.org/10.28970/hh.2019.2.a3

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