Ilusión de profundidad explicativa, un estado del arte

Santiago Arango Muñoz; Alejandro Hernández Ruiz

doi:10.28970/hh.2022.2.a3

Artículos de investigación

Ilusión de profundidad explicativa, un estado del arte

Autores/as

Santiago Arango Muñoz Universidad de Antioquia , Alejandro Hernández Ruiz Universidad de Antioquia ,

La ilusión de profundidad explicativa (ipe) es uno de los fenómenos que ha despertado gran interés en la ciencia cognitiva en los últimos veinte años. Sucede cuando la persona cree poder explicar un fenómeno mejor de lo que realmente puede explicarlo. A continuación, se hará una reconstrucción histórica de los estudios de la IPE a lo largo de las últimas décadas, dando cuenta de su actualidad e importancia. Primero se presentarán los antecedentes y los estudios fundantes de este tema de investigación. A continuación, se expondrán las investigaciones iniciales (años 2002-2015), y la manera como prosiguió la indagación con cuestionamientos y soluciones a la IPE (años 2016-2021). Finalmente, se analizará la relación entre la ipe, las fake news y el internet.

Palabras clave:

Ilusión de profundidad explicativa, Error metacognitivo, Metacognición, Fake news

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