Accesibilidad y fenomenalidad: Reflexiones acerca de una solución empírica a la pregunta de Molyneux

Juan R Loaiza

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En el siglo XVII, William Moleyneux le pregunta a John Locke si una persona quien acaba de adquirir la visión estaría en capacidad de distinguir con certeza un cubo de una esfera sin utilizar el tacto. Aunque esta pregunta parece fácilmente comprobable, responderla no es tan sencillo. En este artículo, ilustro esta pregunta y sostengo que ciertas distinciones acerca del concepto de la conciencia son importantes para encontrar una solución empírica. Primero, describiré la pregunta de Molyneux tal como es enuncia¬da por éste y haré unos breves comentarios acerca de los debates tempranos entorno a la cuestión. En un segundo momento, reconstruiré algunos intentos de responder la pregunta empíricamente, incluyendo algunos experimentos neurocientíficos. Tercero, introduciré algunas distinciones acerca de la conciencia y en luego las aplicaré al caso de Molyneux. Finalmente, consideraré brevemente algunas consecuencias de esta aproximación. Concluyo sugiriendo que la investigación debería estar atenta a los diferentes sentidos en los que pregunta de Molyneux podría plantearse para fines empíricos.

Palabras clave:
percepción visual, percepción táctil, modalidades, fenomenología, consciencia
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Loaiza, J. R. (2020). Accesibilidad y fenomenalidad: Reflexiones acerca de una solución empírica a la pregunta de Molyneux. Humanitas Hodie, 2(2), h223. Recuperado a partir de https://revistas.uniagustiniana.edu.co/index.php/humanitashodie/article/view/96