Psicología intencional e indeterminación: El problema de los casos Quine en la psicología popular de Fodor

Camilo Ramírez Motoa

doi:10.28970/hh.2022.1.a2

Artículos de investigación

Intentional psychology and indeterminacy

The problem of the Quine Cases in Fodor’s Popular Psychology

Authors

Camilo Ramírez Motoa Universidad Nacional de Colombia https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9260-6274 ,

This paper explores the implications of the systematic proliferation of Quine cases in the intentional legal generalizations typical of Fodor’s popular psychology. First, the fundamental aspects of Fodor’s informational semantics are presented. Second, the irruption of the problematic Quine cases is analyzed, paying particular attention to the concessions Fodor is forced to make to deal with them, suggesting that the indeterminacy associated with these cases is maintained. Third, the implications of the persistence of indeterminacy in the psychological generalizations that subsume intentional states are studied. Finally, the possible answers that Fodor could present are evaluated.

Keywords:

semantic, indeterminacy, intencional psychology, folk psychology, informational semantics, Quine, Fodor

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Ramírez Motoa, C. (2022). Intentional psychology and indeterminacy: The problem of the Quine Cases in Fodor’s Popular Psychology. Humanitas Hodie, 5(1), 1-19. https://doi.org/10.28970/hh.2022.1.a2