Variaciones del problema del regreso epistémico de la justificación

Carlos Garzón-Rodríguez

doi:10.28970/hh.2022.2.a5

Artículos de investigación

Variations on the epistemic regress problem

Authors

Carlos Garzón-Rodríguez Universidad de Antioquia ,

This paper presents some variations on the problem of epistemic regress of justification, and the philosophical challenges invoked by them. Drawing on the distinctions between propositional justification and doxastic justification, on the one hand, and the difference between justifying activity and justifying status, on the other, the paper distinguishes between four ways of understanding the problem of epistemic regress. The aim is to show how different kinds of theories about the structure of epistemic justification can emerge depending on how the problem of epistemic regress is understood in one of these four ways. In this way, since there are at least four modes of regress and at least four general ways of dealing with it, there would be at most sixteen possible subclasses for dealing with it.

Keywords:

Epistemic regress, Propositional justification, Doxastic justification, Justifying activity, Justification status

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