La inescrutabilidad de la referencia y su carácterrestrictivo en la formulación de la tesis quineana dela relatividad ontológica

Cristian Felipe  González Hernández

doi:10.28970/

Artículos de investigación

The Inscrutability of Reference and its Restrictive Nature in theFormulation of Quine's Thesis on Ontological Relativity

Authors

Cristian Felipe González Hernández Universidad de La Sabana ,

In “The Inscrutability of Reference” (1979), Donald Davidson argues —contrary to W. V. Quine’s position— that the thesis of the inscrutability of reference cannot support the thesis of ontological relativity. Both authors contend that the reference of terms is inscrutable and, therefore,
based on the same behavioral evidence, we cannot decide the unique reference of a term, as
there would be countless reference options, all equally compatible with the evidence. However, according to Davidson, it does not follow from this that ontology is relative in the sense that each of these reference options could commit us to alternative ontologies relative to specific theories. He considers that the inscrutability of reference is a thesis that restricts knowledge of ontology. Therefore, if we accept it, we are incapacitated from fixing the latter and, in that
sense, from determining whether there can be other alternative ontologies. In this essay, I aim to argue —contrary to Davidson— that the inscrutability of reference is not a restrictive thesis regarding knowledge of ontology, but rather a negative thesis regarding the idea of an absolute
ontology. Therefore, it not only gives rise to ontological relativity but is indeed a requirement for
its emergence.

Keywords:

inscrutability of reference, ontology, ontological relativity, ontological commitment, permutation

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González Hernández, C. F. . (2024). The Inscrutability of Reference and its Restrictive Nature in theFormulation of Quine’s Thesis on Ontological Relativity. Humanitas Hodie, 7(1), 65-87. https://doi.org/10.28970/